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About time

Customer Rating:

Most Americans refer to the "Vietnam War" as if it was a single conflict. But no; defined by time alone, there were three distinct "Vietnam's." A Better War focuses on the last of these, the period around 1970, when we had the war virtually won but elected to leave instead. Note to Author: It's no coincidence that like you it's the last phase of Indochina II that holds me enthralled; I suppose because it's the one I served in (18 months w/ The Americal Division). I believed then as I believe now that we could have achieved ultimate victory at any time with: an all-volunteer force; segregation of North from South by militarizing the 17th parallel all the way to Thailand with heavy forces and, expanding the U.S. Marines' very effective CAPS instead of sending them all home in 1969-70. Bombing campaigns should have been relentless until they yelled "Uncle" and ground strikes into N. Vietnam carried out as needed. I highly recommend this trenchant analysis of our mangled and heartbreaking war. Yours, Richard Vidaurri Author The Gates of the Shadow 144 Pages BookSurge richvidaurri@sbcglobal.net

Outstanding

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A Better War is an outstanding work of history. Sorley, through extensive research and interviews, takes us inside the latter years of the American involvement in Vietnam. Sorley weaves facts, statistics, and personal glimpses seamlessly. While the topic is dense I found myself easily moving through the book, I was just unable to put it down. I would heartily recommend this book to anyone wanting to understand the final years of Vietnam and what was lost due to short sighted political pressures.

The Missing Piece to the Puzzle

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I finished reading "A Better War" by Lewis Sorley - it is subtitled "the unexamined victories and final tragedy of America's last years in Vietnam". I have been searching for answers to some of the questions that have bothered me for over 30 years: how could we win the battles and lose the war? what was the real impact of our strategies on the enemy? what are the lessons for Iraq? This book really hits home - it provides an answer to part of the puzzle. It does this by describing the enormous differences in approach to the war by General Westmoreland and General Abrams. Abrams assumed command of MACV right after Tet '68 - a time when public support for the war had come undone. Some of you may be too young to remember, but I remember it all too well. We had massive demonstrations in the streets of our cities, troops deployed to Wash DC, bombings on college campuses, and hippies who delighted in spitting on our troops. Everything was falling apart. Yet, Abrams somehow managed, with great dignity and integrity, to effectively fight the war in Vietnam despite the intense distractions back home. He recognized that security of the population was the real objective, and that the war could not be won through a strategy of attrition (a strategy which had totally misread the will of the enemy). And so he completely changed the course of the war. Of course, we know how that movie ended....the war was lost politically despite the new strategy and the victories on the battlefield. And we abandoned an entire people and an ally to their fate. And now we are witnessing a replay of the same script in Iraq. One of the most telling parts of the book is in the Epilogue. Long after the war ended and Abrams had died, his son was on the faculty at the Army C+GS College where someone approached him and said that his father "deserved a better war". His son responded at once, " He didn't see it that way. He thought the Vietnamese were worth it." .

First Rate!

Customer Rating:

Reading "A Better War" was a sad experience for this reviewer. For one, BW makes it crystal clear that we lost a war we could have either won or exited with an honorable truce. For another, this reviewer was troubled by some truly acerbic earlier reviews that do not seem justified. That aside, BW covers the period of 1968-1972 when General Creighton Abrams was MACV Commander, replacing General William Westmoreland. Abrams spent the preceding year as Westy's deputy. BW is amply researched and documented. Major chapters encompass the Cambodian campaign of 1970, the invasion of Laos of 1971 ("Lam Song 719"), the Phoenix program, the Easter Offensive of 1972 plus the General's constant efforts to build up the South Vietnamese Army and to pacify the countryside. Author Sorley's contention is that Abrams was successful in these pursuits and produces the military facts to prove his point. This reviewer was particularly struck by the opening of Chapter 13: "There was a time the war was won....it can probably best be dated in late 1970, after the Cambodian invasion in the Spring of the year". That milestone took place just when this reviewer was in country. Sorley thoughts are fully in sync with what some of the higher ups in his unit thought. Then there is the close of Chapter 21: Referring to the Christmas bombing of Hanoi of 1972, (designed to force North Vietnam to wrap up peace talks in Paris), Sir Robert Thompson declared: "You had the war won"-it was over"! RT was the British Commander in Malaya in the 1950s. Instead, Kissinger and Nixon blinked at the bargaining table. Abrams himself pinpointed the main problem: "...the weakest thing in the whole setup, the will of the American people and the will of the American government". That quote may just describe the entire Indochina War in miniature. There is no doubt Abrams managed superbly during a time of shrunken budgets, vanishing home front support, political obstacles galore and vastly reduced manpower (in the year this reviewer was in country about 175,000 guys went home). The situation was surely "fluid". Were civilian leaders Nixon, Clifford, Laird, Averill Harriman and Henry Kissinger ever on the same page? Were they all running there own agendas isolating Abrams to fight the war? BW is not a "paen", but an unflinching look at the final years of the United States in Vietnam. BWs clear point is that matters went down the drain NOT when we had 543,000 troops in country but after most of them were back in the World! Only 4 stars are awarded "A Better War" solely because of the implicit criticism of General Westmoreland's command of MACV from '64-'68. This reviewer has no idea if Westy was right or wrong but he did serve his country bravely and honorably for over 30 years. He deserves a posthumous word in his defense. That said, BW is flatly recommended to anyone wanting to broaden their awareness, refresh their memories, or learn anew about the conflict that affected so many of us.

A brilliant fresh view

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I teach a course on the Vietnam War and thought I knew something about the subject. The author's carefully documented analysis, making use of much of the newly-available sources from both sides (all sides) makes it clear that Westmoreland's attrition strategy was never the only choice open to him barring invasion of North Vietnam or China. Abrams effectively won the war despite a dwindling pool of resources and left it won. It was only Congress, and the radical American Left that managed to destroy South Vietnam afterward with minor help from the North Vietnamese.