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Not a Value Investing Book

Customer Rating:

This book is not about value investing, it is about modern security analysis, which is exactly what Graham warned against. It places an emphasis on growth over actual value. One of Graham's fundamental principles was that future growth is completely unreliable and any analysis based on it is just a speculator's way of justifying his gamble. While I liked the book's coverage on franchises and competitive advantage it highlights the fact that fundamentals weren't discussed at all. Here is the biggest example of why this book is so far off the mark. It highlights Intel as a value investment. The stock currently has a P/E of 25x and has always been over priced from a valuation standpoint. Not only that but Intel's only possible competitive advantage is size. Yes modern value investors look for good companies with long term competitive advantage but not at a high cost. Buffett was famous for sitting out the dotcom boom because they were not value investments. The only reason this book was not a one star book were the biographies of value investors in the second half of the book.

A book I go back to again and again

Customer Rating:

I got this book from Amazon several years ago, have read it several times and applied it to my own investing. It is not for beginners, but does not require a Phd either. The authors present a rational philosophy and a unique, detailed method that will help you to really estimate the intrinsic value of a share of stock, and then they walk you through actual examples. The writing is interesting, concise, well organized, and clear. The book provides a backgroud of traditional value investing methods, and then introduces a model which builds upon and advances the body of value investing knowledge. I have read many books on value investing, and this is probably the best. Some of the material is difficult, but even if you don't get everything you will still profit from the book and find it interesting and thought provoking. The second half of the book, from Chapter 9 to the end, profiles various professional value investors, their philosophies and methods. This part of the book was probably included mostly to provide filler, but it is easy reading and contains some useful information.

A Serious Academic Treatment to Value Investing

Customer Rating:

While reading Graham himself is invaluable, this book is an excellent contribution to the field of value investing in its own right, and brings modern techniques that have been employed in this field for finding value. In addition, the author does an excellent job at qualifying Graham's valuation techniques over DCF valuation. Value investors do not disagree with DCF in principle, but its reliability, based on countless assumptions may not produce consistent results that align a firm's current reality and strategy with its intrinsic value. The latter part of the book discusses techniques of well known value investors and innovations to the field that they have brought to the table. Gabelli's private market value and control premium concept, as well as Seth Klarman's theme of looking for forced sellers are some of the highlights in this section.

Star Trek

Customer Rating:

The authors announce their intention to bravely go "beyond" Graham and Buffet. I found their effort extraordinarily interesting. Not because it brings new ideas from the frontiers of Value Investing; but rather because it forced me to revalidate old ones. Written mainly by academics, the book attempts - with undeniable clarity - to provide a simple framework for valuation of a firm using Value Investment principles. First, three sources of value are defined: Asset Value; Earnings Power Value; and Value of Growth. Second, some conceptual tricks are employed to link them in a theoretical structure capable of supporting hours of animated tutorial discussion. The importance of Asset Value in the scheme derives from the idea that if a firm that has no defenses against competitors it is worth no more, or less, than the replacement value of the assets necessary to set up a similar business. To illustrate, imagine a defenseless firm that is worth 2x on the stockmarket while its productive assets are worth only 1x. Attracted by the absence of barriers to entry and by the high market value achievable with a substantially lower investment, enterprising businessmen set up similar businesses. As the new capacity comes on stream the market is inundated with products of the same type and prices and profits consequently fall. The process only ends when the market value of all the firms has fallen to the value of their assets, thus eliminating the differential that attracted new market entrants in the first place. For this to happen we must have an idealized market of perfect competition: lots of buyers and sellers, undifferentiated products, no barriers to entry, perfect information, etc. In practice, however, a dozen firms with similar assets will generate a dozen different levels of profit. And in the end, as the book admits, it is profit expectations, not assets, that determine the value of an on-going business. I wondered if Graham and his associates ever subscribed to this concept. In my 5th edition of "Security Analysis" I found the ambiguous comment: "ECONOMISTS believe that high returns on capital attract competition which ultimately forces down the rate of profit" (my capitalization). This same edition affirms that it is "The earning power of the assets in use (that) determines their investment value" (rather than the replacement value of these assets). I could find no evidence that the notion formed a key part of the valuation process described in the value-investing classic. Moving on, We are told that the major difference between Earnings Power Value and Value of Growth, when used to estimate intrinsic value, is the confidence we can place on the result. It is notable, however, that both definitions of value exist in the same continuum. To calculate Earnings Power Value we can simply assume growth to be zero in the traditional Discounted Cashflow formula for estimating intrinsic value. Beyond a certain point it is reasonable to suppose that the degree of confidence we can put on an intrinsic value calculation falls with the size of profit growth projected. How much faith would we have in a value based on a growth projection of 30% per annum, for example? But why should zero growth produce an intrinsic value closer to the truth than 5% per annum? Is one really inherently safer than the other? What about the risk of deceleration in the case of an assumption of zero growth? Conservatism does not mean ignoring reality. Once again it all seems part of a jolly academic game. The questionable differentiation between Earnings Power Value and Value of Growth allows the authors to find a role for another element: the franchise - the defenses the firm possesses against competition. They thus arrive at a tidy little conceptual framework. If a firm has no franchise then its intrinsic value is represented by its Asset Value. If the franchise is weak then we base our estimate on its Earnings Power Value. And if it has a rock-solid franchise we might just be able to introduce the Value of Growth. Does all this have any useful meaning in the real world? Aside from these conceptual questions I found the book exceptionally practical in describing the details of how to value the assets and evaluate the franchise of a firm. On the other hand I found the profiles of eight value investors rather tedious.

Exceptional Addition for Any Investor	Customer Rating:
Fantastic summary of modern value investing. Greenwald looks at the discipline with the critical eye of a professor, making it more informative than many other books about the subject. Even seasoned value investors will learn from this book.